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1 Introduction
Natural language has been studied from many different points of view. One of these points
of view is given by knowledge graph theory, a theory developed at the University of Twente
since 1982. A graph G=G(V,E) consists of a set V of vertices and a set E of edges, pairs
of vertices from V. The reader is referred to any textbook on graph theory for the, in most
cases self-evident, terminology. G(V,E) is an undirected graph. If the pairs are ordered
the set of edges is replaced by a set A of arcs and G(V,A) is then called a directed graph.
The edges or arcs may carry labels and the graph is then called a labeled graph. We will
also consider pairs that can be ordered or not and will then speak of a mixed graph.
The labels considered in the theory are modeling relationship types of pairs. The
choice of these types stands central in the discussion of the theory as structuralistic theory
of language. We will come back to this choice of eight types of binary relationships. First
we must mention that there are also four types of frames. Suppose we have a mixed labeled
graph, which we will call a knowledge graph, for reasons that will become clear soon. Then
we may consider any subgraph, not necessarily induced, and see this as a unit. We will say
that the subgraph has been framed. The subgraph can be represented by a vertex as well.
Its elements, vertices and labeled edges or/and arcs, are put in relationship with that
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vertex by arcs of the type FPAR, for ”Frame PARt”. Note that here edges and arcs are
seen as single elements, not as pairs of vertices. In the socalled total graph representation
they can be represented by vertices.
Frames may be labeled too. The most important type of labelling is attachment of a
word, a name for the frame. As this will play a central role in our discussion, throughout
this paper, let us already mention that, given a certain knowledge graph, two different
subgraphs might be framed and given the same name. The two subgraphs may then be
called homonymic structures. In case one specific subgraph is framed the naming may be
by two, or more, different words, that may then be called synonymic words. This already
hints at where the theory is aiming at.
The line of reasoning in knowledge graph theory is the following. People, and probably
also animals, process perceptions, in the sense that neural networks in the brain determine
types of relationships between them. A natural modeling is by representing the perception
units by vertices and the relationships by labeled edges or arcs. The ”content” of the mind
is thus modeled by a mind graph.
In the beginning of the knowledge graph project, texts were extracted and the knowledge
in the texts was represented by what was called a knowledge graph. Only three types of
relationship were used, a ”causal-”, a ”part of-” and a ”kind of-” relationship, see Bakker
[1], de Vries [24] and Smit [21]. Most of the texts was simply left out of consideration. In a
second phase of the project all elements of texts were considered and the graph structure
was investigated on its ability to represent both natural language and logic. For logic the
formalism had to be extended by four types of frames. A proposition p is a linguistic
expression that may be represented by a knowledge graph, that is seen as a frame labeled
p. Van den Berg [2] showed that, by introducing a NEG-frame, for negation, a POS-frame,
for possibility, and a NEC-frame, for necessity, the logical expressions ¬p, 3p and 2p can
be represented and, together with an AND-frame, therewith the various logical systems.
These are the types of frames we mentioned before.
Our discussion will focus on natural language modeling by knowledge graphs, see
Willems [27]. The set of types in the ontology had to be extended considerably. We
will only mention the final result, at the moment of writing. EQU, SUB, ALI and DIS are
types, due to the four ways two sets A and B can be related. Equality; A = B, being a
subset; A ⊂ B, alikeness; A ∩B 6= ∅ and disparateness; A ∩B = ∅, determined four types
of the relationships in the ontology of knowledge graph theory. The assumption is that
brains have developed ways to recognize these four types, due basically to the granular
structure of the world.
Two more types are CAU and ORD, for causality and ordering respectively. Possibly the
philosopher Hume [20] is right and the ORD-relationship is more basic than the CAU-
relationship. But in modeling the physical world causality is extremely important, reason
to keep this type in the ontology. Both types refer to the space-time aspects of the world.
The seventh and eighth type included, PAR and SKO, are particularly interesting in the
context of this paper because they refer to ”active” processing by the mind, whereas the
six other types of relationships model a more ”passive” processing of perceptions. Here
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we should immediately say that in the process of thought these types too may play an
important role. We will come back to this point later.
The ”activity” is best explained by two examples. Suppose a speaker says ”this is a nice
pitbull”, then the words ”nice” and ”pitbull” are put in relationship with each other in the
mind of the speaker. The, rather subjective, statement boils down to linking something
named ”nice” to something named ”pitbull”. Unlike in ”this is a white pitbull”, where
both colour and dog are due to perceptions, the word ”nice” does not refer to a perception.
We typically have to do with an attribution by the speaker. ”Nice” is an attribute of the
pitbull, not a part of the pitbull, like its tail, which should be modeled by a SUB-link, or
a property of the pitbull, which should be modeled by an FPAR-link. Note that we have
made a precise distinction between three merological relationships here. The common use
of the preposition ”of” has led to the choice of the label PAR. ATT, for attribution, might
have been an alternative, but also the FPAR-relationship, between a named frame and its
constituents, the properties of the something with that name, is due to an ”active” process
in the mind. The mind determines what is to be understood under a given name. Hence,
PAR and FPAR are similar in nature.
Our second example should explain the SKO-link. The label is deduced from the name
Skolem, a logician. It expresses that something is seen as informationally dependent on
something else. In mathematics a function gives a good example. The value of the function,
a number, depends on the number that is mapped by the prescription. Such a mapping is
not perceived by the mind, but is actively established by the mind.
These two examples should make our distinction between active and passive processing
by the mind clear. Observing some ordering may lead to a ”picture” in the mind, that
is a mind graph, in which the ORD-arc occurs, as the ORD-link, like the SUB-link,the
CAU-link, the PAR-link, the SKO-link and the FPAR-link, is oriented. The EQU-link, the
ALI-link and the DIS-link are not oriented and are represented by edges. The mind can be
seen as just registering the relationships, passively. However, in the process of designing
some apparatus, the mind might, actively, use the ORD-link, constructing a part of its
mind graph describing the design.
The main point of the theory summarized sofar is the fact that the processing by the
mind is seen as an essential part of the theory of language. A language might be seen as
a set of words that can be combined in certain linear orderings according to syntactical
rules. The users of the language are then left out of the theory. This is very much in line
with the way one is dealing with a subject in physics or mathematics. However, that may
be the proper way to deal with formal languages, as considered in computer science, it
is not the proper way to deal with natural language. The speaker and the listener,
and their minds, are essential for a proper account of what natural language is
about.
This comes forward especially with respect to semantics. Two unfortunate things influ-
enced the theory building. The first thing was the restriction to see language as a set of
sentences, ruled by a generative grammar, thus focusing on syntax mainly, and restricting
the set of sentences to so-called well-formed formulae. This development was strongly in-
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fluenced by the development of formal computer languages. The focus on syntax was so
strong that Chomsky even suggested that people had an innate ability to generate sen-
tences. Though understandable, this was an unfortunate suggestion. If it were so, the
generative grammars of the about 6000 languages in the world should show much more
similarity. The ordering of subject S, verb V and object O in a sentence may be as in
English, which is an SVO-language. However, all six orderings occur, in Japanese e.g. the
verb comes at the end. It is an SOV-language. An innate ability to generate sentences
could not be expected to allow this diversity and, in fact, the suggestion was gradually
withdrawn.
The focus on syntax led to considerable difficulty in dealing with semantics. The second
unfortunate thing was the solution for this coming from the side of logicians, who were
inclined to deal with natural language in the same way as with formal languages. For-
mal languages are important for correctness proofs of algorithms. Does the algorithm do
what it is supposed to do? That is the central question posed. Giving its answer led to
model-theoretical semantics and truth-conditional semantics. That was an important de-
velopment, for formal languages! The unfortunate thing was making the assumption that
the same ideas should be applicable to natural language. A well-known example should
make this point clear. Suppose that in a closed room a speaker says :”it is raining outside”.
The listeners are in control of English and are asked whether they understand what has
been said. They will probably all say that they do. The fact, whether it is really raining
outside or not, is completely irrelevant! Yet semanticists in the mathematical-logical tra-
dition will say something like: ”the semantics have not been properly defined”. Within
the framework of their thinking about language, in general(!), they are right, but only by
the assumption that natural language should indeed be dealt with as formal languages
are dealt with! The most unfortunate thing is that they form a majority. The number
of theorists of language that focus on semantics from the beginning and do not bother so
much about syntax, truth values and formal models is considerably smaller. One reference
to this ”camp” in linguistics is [5]. The theory of knowledge graphs also belongs to this
camp.
Let us summarize the basic elements of this theory now. People are considered to have
a structured representation in their mind in the form of a mind graph. This mind graph
is determined by processing of perception units or by autogenous generation, as the mind
can be creative. Our distinction between ”passive” and ”active” processing was only made
to make the position of the PAR-link and the SKO-link clear. In principle there is only
active processing.
The vertices of the mind graph are the basic elements of the ontology, called tokens. All
of them are of type ”something”, also if they are frames. In first instance no words are
involved. The links between the tokens are of eight types. The labels used for these types
are not words either. They are used on the meta-level of discussion, as the word token is.
Together with the four frame types, the token and the eight types of links form the full
ontology of knowledge graph theory.
Words come in as names of frames, by a process of framing and naming by the mind.
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It is this process that might be suggested to be innate instead of the gener-
ation process for sentences. We may use different words for a particular frame, but
the process of doing that seems language independent! Another important remark is that
thinking is linking somethings. This implies that a thought is a subgraph of the mind graph
and that e.g. designing is an active creation of a subgraph.
The frame that is named by a word is a subgraph called word graph. A sentence has a
corresponding sentence graph. Note that here we should immediately make the distinction
between such graphs as we may discuss in our theory and such graphs as ”are actually in
the mind” of a speaker or listener and of which the former are models.
The most important statement explaining the basic idea of the theory is that the structure
is the meaning. This expresses that the meaning of a word is the word graph for that word
and the meaning of a sentence is the sentence graph for that sentence. In the rest of this
paper, we will try to show how these basic ideas compare with other theories of semantics.
Here we have chosen as reference the Chapters 8 and 9 of the classical book of Lyons on
semantics [16]. Although already dated, this choice avoids the ”mer a` boire” on semantic
theory and allows for easy consultation and comparison by the reader.
For completeness of our account, the third phase of the knowledge graph project should
be mentioned. Liu [15] and Zhang [28] wrote theses on the description of the language
of Chinese. The work of Willems was extended in this direction with the main goal to
prove that knowledge graph theory was indeed capable of dealing with specific features of
languages rather different from English. This line of research started with an investigation
of word graphs for nouns, verbs and prepositions by Hoede and Li [11]. A second set
of word graphs, for adverbs, adjectives and Chinese classifiers, gathered under the name
adwords, were investigated by Hoede and Liu [12]. A third set of word types, the socalled
logic words, was investigated by Hoede and Zhang [13]. In both theses, of Liu and Zhang,
the problem of translation was considered, next to the problem of information extraction
of texts.
The problem of translation is answered as follows. Given a sentence in language L1 a
sentence graph is constructed. This is called structural parsing, which was introduced in
Zhang [28]. For this two types of word graphs were introduced for each word, a syntactic
word graph, describing the way words can be combined, e.g. as adjective and noun, and a
semantic word graph, describing the meaning of the word. Note that both types of word
graph are expressed in terms of the ontology, that contains links on the sub-word level.
This makes this way of representation language independent.
After structural parsing the sentence graph in L1 has to be transformed into a sentence
graph in L2. This is the main problem for translation and will be discussed further on
in this paper. The third phase in translation is uttering. This too has been discussed by
Zhang [28].
For all other aspects of knowledge graph theory we refer to the references [14], [27], [9],
[15] and [28], where it is attempted to give a complete survey, at the moments of writing.
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2 The terminological chaos
It is remarkable that in a field like linguistics there are papers with a title like: ”Sense,
Denotation, Reference: A terminological/philosophical chaos”, by Materna [17]. However,
such a title is not completely unjustified. There is unclear use of words, as will become
clear in the attempt to defend the knowledge graph position on terminology in the field of
semantics.
Historically 1892 can be seen as the year in which the confusion started, with Frege’s
paper on ”Sinn” and ”Bedeutung”, [6]. A German-English dictionary [4] gives ”sense, or-
gan of perception, faculty, mind” for ”Sinn” and ”meaning” as well as ”sense (of a word)”
for ”Bedeutung”, and the problem comes forward. As we have stressed that the minds of
speakers and listeners should be taken up into the theory and that minds can be ”active”,
we start with looking at the verb ”deuten”, for which we find ”explain, expound, interpret”.
In Webster’s dictionary [25], we read under ”meaning” a.o. ”SENSE applies especially to
words or utterances and may denote one out of several meanings of any one word” and
”MEANING is the general term used of anything (as word, poem, action) requiring or
allowing interpretation”.
The first interesting things are that the desciptions involve an active mind, that interprets
and gives meaning to something, usually a word or a sentence. Moreover, ”sense” is de-
scribed as ”denoting one out of several meanings of any one word”. Here we can start
defending our theory. Hearing or using a word, a person has an interpretation of the word
in mind. This interpretation is, in our theory, a semantic word graph. That word graph
is the meaning given to the word by that person. This is not only a subjective process,
it can also be done in several ways, i.e., a more or less extended word graph can exist in
the mind. All these word graphs are meanings that can be given to the word, there is
abundant homonymy.
If the word is part of a sentence, likewise various sentence graphs, i.e., various interpre-
tations, can correspond to the sentence. This extends the set of meanings of a word
considerably, as now the sentence graph embedding the concept (we will come back to
this word) is enlarged. Each knowledge graph containing a specific word is a meaning of
the word. If two words are contained in the graph this implies that both formally have
the same meaning. A distinction can be made by considering foreground knowledge and
background knowledge in a knowledge graph. The subgraph induced by the concept and its
direct neighbours is the foreground knowledge about the concept. The subgraph on all ver-
tices but that for the concept is the background knowledge about the concept. Two words
in the same knowledge graph have different foreground meaning and different background
meaning.
For our interpretation of ”sense” we discuss a famous example sentence: ”green ideas
sleep violently”. The four words may have, depending on the word graph dictionary,
representations as word graphs like
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EQU ALI
ALI
CAU ALI
EQU ALI
green (colour)
ideas
sleep
violently (way) .
A word related to a token by a directed ALI-link gives the type of the token, and
when related to the token by a directed EQU-link gives an instantiation of the type. This
occurs with ”green” and ”violently”. The intransitive verb ”sleep” is having a subject
token related to the token for ”sleep” by a CAU-link. Transitive verbs also have a CAU-
link from the verb-token to the object-token. In the syntactic word graph for a verb the
CAU-links are replaced by SKO-links, see Zhang [28]. ”Ideas” are just typing a token here,
but the token may represent a large frame describing the meaning of ”ideas”.
Structural parsing leads to the sentence graph
ALI CAU ALI
EQU EQU
PAR PAR
ALI ALI
ideas sleep
green violently
(colour) (way) .
The parentheses around ”colour” and ”way” indicate that these words are not men-
tioned in the sentence. The sentence graph is constructed using the syntactic word graphs,
that contain a.o. the PAR-links, that have come in. That is why this graph is called a
meaning of the sentence, although one may pose the question: ”does the sentence make
sense?”. This is where the semantic word graphs come in. The four graphs given do not
forbid the construction of the sentence graph. However, all four have a much larger sub-
graph of the mind graph as meaning. For linking ”green”, i.e. a ”colour”, to something
like ”ideas” the larger word graph for ”ideas” should contain the concept colour as an ele-
ment that can be attributed to ideas. Likewise the CAU-link between ”ideas” and ”sleep”
may not be present in the extended word graph for ”ideas”. The given sentence graph,
that would describe much more about the four words, would then not be constructible for
reason that a PAR-link and a CAU-link cannot be justified. So, if no sentence graph can
be constructed, the sentence has no sense. If a sentence graph can be constructed, then
that sentence graph is a meaning of the sentence and gives a sense to the sentence. An
interpretation constructed by a mind is nothing but such a sentence graph and the mind
understands the sentence in that sense.
We have let the word ”denote” slip in when saying that ”SENSE may denote one of
several meanings of any one word”, quoted from Webster’s dictionary. For ”denote” we
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read ”DENOTE and CONNOTE, when used of words, together equal ”mean”. DENOTE
implies all that strictly belongs to the definition of the word. CONNOTE implies all the
ideas or emotions suggested by the word.”. This is in line with our theory. Given a
subgraph G of the mind graph that a mind associates with a word, then the foreground
meaning might be considered by the mind as a definition, although any subgraph G− of
the considered subgraph G, that is associated with the word, might also be taken as a
definition. It is this subgraph G− that is then the denotation of the word. All elements of
G that do not belong to G− form the connotation of the word. The denotation is thus seen
as one of the meanings of the word, depending on the definition chosen by the mind. The
addition of ”by the mind” is essential for our discussion. As remarked before, homonymy
is abundant. A word is given a meaning by ”taking together” parts of the mind graph. It
is therefore that its meaning, this framed structure, is also called concept.
Sofar we have only considered the relationship between name and frame, i.e., between
word and concept denoted by the word. The various ways a concept can be thought of,
i.e., be linked with other concepts, are senses in which the word can be understood. Each
sense is a meaning, a structure, namely a subgraph of the mind graph.
It may seem that we try to strictly follow the philosopher Berkeley, known for his thesis that
the only thing existing was Berkeley’s mind! This is not entirely the case. We do develop
our theory from consideration of processes in the mind. However, next to Descartes’ ”cogito
ergo sum”, we can put ”cogitas ergo es”, as argument against Berkeley’s thesis. Note that
”cogitare” in Latin means ”bringing together”, but is usually translated by ”thinking”, in
line with our theory. The observation of the terminological chaos hints at the existence of
other minds. ”You think so you are” is the argument for the assumption that there are
other minds, a world outside the mind!
This brings us to the meaning triangle, introduced in 1923 by Ogden and Richards [18],
and to the term (3) ”referent”, next to (1) sign, symbol or word and (2) concept, intension,
thought, idea , meaning, definition or sense, as other two vertices of a triangle, of which we
sofar discussed the relationship and tried to make clear the subtle differences, in particular
for the meaning structures.
The intension of a word is sometimes seen as synonymous with its definition. This way dif-
ferent definitions can be compared and, in the line of ”normal” science, a unique definition
can be determined. The same, of course, is attempted for word meanings, but dictionaries
prove that there is no consensus, as does the title of this section! There is the possibility
to reserve the word intension for the whole subgraph of a mind graph, activated by the
word. But not only makes this the intension different in the minds of different people, the
activation clearly comes ”from the outside”. Intension is intimately related with extension,
the set of all existing things to which the word applies.
Before making choices, let us remark that a thought or idea is a subgraph of the mind
graph, a frame, that need not be named. The other way around a, strange, word need not
have a meaning for the mind. Interesting is the word ”unicorn”, that does have a meaning
and can be defined, say as ”white horse with a horn”. Let us focus now on the descripton
of perceptions. There are many pictures, paintings or tapestries showing unicorns in the
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world. These pictures are perceived and are represented in the mind as well! This is an
important remark. Berkeley is right in stating that basically we have only the mental
representation of the outside world at our disposal. The perceived picture is what can be
compared with the word graph at our disposal, when trying to give a description. The
word intension may be reserved for this substructure of the mind graph, a rather large
structure if all details are included. A word to describe it will necessarily have a word
graph that is a substructure of the perceived structure. This substructure is then typing
the perceived structure. The triangle can then be given as
CONCEPT
SYMBOL INTENSION OBJECT.
Let the symbol be ”unicorn” and let, of all concepts that may carry that name, ”living
horse with horn” be chosen as unique definition of ”unicorn”. The perceived structure does
not include the substructure to which ”living” corresponds and the conclusion is that the
concept unicorn does not type the intension. Had the definition been ”picture of a horse
with a horn”, then this concept does type the intension. In the first case the extension is
an empty set, as far as we know, in the second case the extension is a rather large set.
Now the word reference can be given a place in our theory. Consider the word ”cow”.
This is the name of a frame, a subgraph of the mind graph of a person. That is what the
word directly refers to, and that is its meaning. In the original meaning triangle the top
vertex was also described as ”reference”. Let us now consider the intension of the word
”cow”. If a cow is perceived a large structure is created in the mind. Perceiving more
cows gradually reduces this structure to an image that describes, for one mind, what may
be taken as the meaning of ”cow”. However, the definition of ”cow” may be considerably
simpler, because the perceived common features of the cows seen may be too many to be
brought under words. The reference of the word ”cow” may be, as a substructure, present
in the structure that we call intension, distilled from the cows perceived. This reference,
as a substructure of the intension, types the perceived objects as cows.
Confusion arises if the word ”referent”, as that what is referred to, is used for the third
vertex of the meaning triangle, where we have sofar considered ”intension”. For the third
vertex not only ”referent” or ”object”, but also ”extension” is mentioned in literature.
Clearly the real cows are meant! But is a specific real cow a referent for the word ”cow”?
Our position is that this is not the case. The word ”cow” refers directly to a concept, not to
an object. Even descriptions like ”cow, black and white skin, called Clara, number shield
”2” in ear” may not uniquely determine an object and can have a set of cows as objects
the intension of which contains that description, in the form of a graph as a substructure.
In the extreme case, that there is indeed only one such cow, the description refers to a
substructure of the perception, which is then equal to the intension of that, one-element,
set!
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Instead of speaking of ”referent” of the word or description, it seems better to use the
word ”extension” for the objects that are described, and say that their ”intension” refers
to them. Then the extension is the referent, but not of the word or description, but of
the intension, which is not the same. Usually the first and third vertex of the meaning
triangle are depicted as connected by a dotted line, suggesting that the relationship is not
that clear. As an alternative we propose a meaning path of four vertices in the form
SYMBOL CONCEPT INTENSION EXTENSION
naming typing referring to .
It is interesting to represent this meaning path as a knowledge graph:
ALI ALI ALI ALI
PAR FPAR SKO
SYMBOL CONCEPT INTENSION EXTENSION.
All three types of links, that we discussed as describing active processing in the mind,
occur, the attribution (PAR), the typing(FPAR) and the informational dependency (SKO).
3 An analysis of sense relations
In this section we intend to show how various distinctions among sense relations holding
within sets of lexemes, as discussed in Chapter 9 of Lyons’ book [16], are described in
knowledge graph theory. We follow his division into subsections. Chapter 8, on semantic
fields, will likewise be discussed in Section 4. The translation problem will be discussed
separately in Section 5.
3.1 Opposition
Oppositeness of meaning between lexemes is called antonymy. Given a word like ”white”,
one might consider the word ”non-white”. In knowledge graph theory this can be expressed
by using the NEG-frame. The problem is whether there is another, less constructed,
antonym. For ”white” this is not the case, although many people would suggest ”black”.
As the meaning of a word is seen as the, subjective, semantic word graph associated with
the word, people may indeed see white and black as antonyms, simply because they do
not see a third concept as belonging to the same category as these two concepts. We are
forced here to analyze the concepts on an intersubjective, i.e., an objective, level, as is
usual in natural science. We recall that in knowledge graph theory the processes in the
mind are included in the object of study, in fact are seen as essential for the understanding
of natural language.
As for white and black, physics teaches that visible light has a spectrum of wavelengths.
Sunlight is seen as composed of photons of all physically possible wavelengths. If an object
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absorbs photons of certain wavelengths, the object’s colour is determined by the reflected
photons. An object is white when all photons are reflected and black when all photons
are absorbed. In this sense white and black are, extreme, instances of colours. In nature
reflected light is probably never ”monochromatic”, i.e., consisting of photons of precisely
one wavelength. The important point is, of course, that, next to white and black, there
are many other colours. ”Non-white” does not imply ”black”.
The distinction between gradable and ungradable opposites asks for a discussion too. In
case of the presence of some scale, for colours this poses a nice modeling problem that we
will not discuss here, the two extremes of the scale may be seen as opposites. Such a pair,
however, differs essentially from a pair for which no third comparable can be indicated.
The pair ”male ” and ”female”, ungradable opposites, gives an example of true antonyms,
unless ”hermaphrodite” is pointed at.
Gradation involves an ordering. This means that word graphs differing with respect to
some arc, in particular to an ORD-link, may correspond with words that are opposites. In
its most basic form we find the pair ”from” and ”to”, with word graphs that correspond
to the ORD-arc with accent on the begin vertex respectively accent on the end vertex,
see Hoede and Li [11]. The same oppositeness is present in pairs like ”front” and ”back”,
”up” and ”down”, etc. Also with respect to other types of directed links, in the ontology
of knowledge graph theory, such opposites can be indicated.
With respect to the CAU-arc we mention ”cause” and ”effect” as well as what Lyons calls
converseness. A sentence ”John killed Bill” has the same sentence graph as the sentence
”Bill was killed by John”. The sentence graph includes two consecutive CAU-arcs, from
”John” to ”kill” and from ”kill” to ”Bill”. Uttering can be by an utterance path, see Zhang
[28], starting from the token representing ”John” or from the token representing ”Bill”,
traversing the same sentence graph against the direction of the CAU-arcs.
The merological relationship types, PAR-link, FPAR-link and SUB-link lead to converse
opposites like ”with” and ”of”. For the SUB-arc also the pair ”in” and ”out” should be
mentioned, but here ”out”, or ”ouside”, is essentially ”not in”.
If ”antonyms” is used only for pairs of type ”W” and ”non-W”, ”with” and ”of” as pair
differ from ”with” and ”non-with”, i.e., from ”with” and ”without”. The latter pair are
antonyms, the former pair are not. They are converse opposites.
3.2 Directional opposition
In discussing the opposition induced by directed arcs of the ontology of knowledge graph
theory we already saw that in particular the ORD-link is involved in lexical opposition.
Lyons distinguishes between antonymy (narrowly defined in terms of gradability) , comple-
mentarity, converseness and directional opposition. We will have to formulate our position
here. This also holds for terms like contradictories, contraries, polarity and contrast. The
first two of these four terms concern propositions and are therefore not considered here, as
we want to compare word meanings.
Polarity refers to distinction of opposites, say ”good” and ”bad”, into a positive and a
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negative one. Lyons mentions a preference in stating both words as a criterion for de-
termining their polarity. If people prefer saying ”high and low” above saying ”low and
high”, an aspect is coming in that is not an objective meaning aspect. This is reason not
to consider this term either. The fourth term, contrast, is seen by Lyons as genus of both
antonymy and opposition, and we do not consider the term in our attempt to get clear
distinctions.
Converseness is exemplified by pairs like ”husband” and ”wife”. Lyons mentions the ”con-
verse” propositions: ”X is the husband of Y” and Y is the wife of X”. Like for the example
given in Section 3.1, ”John killed Bill” and ”Bill was killed by John”, we have one sen-
tence graph, now with meaning ”male X married to female Y”, that can be uttered in two
converse ways. This type of contrast was also met with the pair of prepositions ”from”
and ”to”, both with word graphs that are subgraphs of the graph consisting of a single
ORD-arc. If the graph consists of two vertices, one for tail T and one for dog D, connected
by a SUB-arc, we may say ”tail T of dog D” or, conversely, ”dog D with tail T”.
All these relationships between two words, expressed by a knowledge graph of which
both are part may be called converse relationships. Directional opposition is essentially
not of this type, as exemplified in ”forward” and ”backward”, where in a knowledge graph
for ”moving forward” an ORD-link will occur. That graph does not contain a word graph
for ”backward”, because for ”moving backward” the ORD-link has to be reversed, which
is essentially different from the situation where the graph is not changed as is the case for
converseness.
Lyons writes: ”Opposition will be restricted to dichotomous, or binary, contrasts; and
antonymy will be restricted still further, to gradable opposites, such as ”big” and ”small”,
”high ” and ”low”, etc.”. We can agree with opposition as binary contrast. However, the
given examples are analogous to our ”white” and ”black” example. Grading on a scale
almost always involves a third element on the scale. We repeat our suggestion to use the
word antonyms for pairs of type ”W” and ”non-W”, representable by a frame and the same
frame within a NEG-frame respectively.
3.3 Hyponymy
We will not discuss non-binary contrasts, as they are not relevant in the context of knowl-
edge graph theory. Hyponymy is relevant. The relationship between ”cow” and ”animal”
in the sentence ”a cow ISA animal” has been subject to much discussion in the literature.
The question is what ISA means in this sentence. The answer from knowledge graph the-
ory is the following. The meaning of ”cow” and ”animal” is given by word graphs that
may be as large as the intensions of both words, see Section 2. What makes a cow an
animal is that the word graph for animal can be found back in the word graph for cow as
a substructure. That substructure can be seen as the genus, the rest of the word graph for
cow as the differentiae in the classical description of the type hierarchy in the vocabulary.
In knowledge graph terminology the relationship is described by the FPAR-link. The con-
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cept ”animal” is frame part of the concept ”cow”. The FPAR-link is therefore inverse to
the ISA-link. Whereas the intension of ”animal” is frame part of the intension of ”cow”,
the extension of ”animal”, of course, includes the extension of ”cow”.
The token in knowledge graph theory is said to be ”something”, which is a concept of
which all other concepts are hyponyms. It is the top of the type hierarchy. An interesting
mathematical theory is formal concept analysis, developed by Wille et al. [8], in which a
concept is defined as the pair (intension,extension), i.e., the last two vertices in the meaning
path. Knowledge graph theory focuses on the first two vertices of the meaning path.
3.4 Part-whole relations
Lyons discusses lexical gaps, which we do not consider here, and marking of terms, which he
calls an extremely important concept in structural linguistics. Formal marks are suffixes,
like -ess, or prefixes like un-, in- or dis-. They occur rather often. From the point of view of
knowledge graph theory these markings correspond to substructures of word graphs. The
mentioned prefixes e.g. correspond to the occurrence of a NEG-frame. This is the only
thing we would like to mention here.
Very interesting, from the ontological point of view, are the part-whole relations, also
called merological relationships. In the ontology there are three merological links, the SUB-
link, the FPAR-link and the PAR-link, for part-of, property-of and attribute-of respectively.
Let us first quote a sentence from Lyons’ section on componential analysis: ”This approach
to the description of the meaning of words and phrases rests upon the thesis that the sense
of every lexeme can be analyzed in terms of a set of more general sense-components (or
semantic features), some or all of which will be common to several different lexemes in the
vocabulary.”. This is precisely the thesis of knowledge graph theory, where the ontology
forms the set of sense-components.
In particular the three mentioned merological relationships should be enough to rep-
resent all part-of relationships. In principle this can only be shown by giving the explicit
knowledge graphs in which both elements of the relationship occur. We will just go through
a few of the examples mentioned by Lyons.
”Arm ” and ”body” are linked by a SUB-arc, as is clear from considering the sets of
molecules of both. The problem of transitivity, in the mathematical sense, can be an-
swered clearly. SUB-relationship and FPAR-relationship are both transitive. The PAR-
relationship is not. For that reason the subset-set relationship is represented by a SUB-
link, but the element-set relationship is represented by a PAR-link. The transitive FPAR-
relationship was considered in particular for hyponyms. If a cow is a mammal and a
mammal is an animal, then a cow is an animal. If ”animal” is a frame part of ”mammal”,
that is a frame part of ”cow”, then ”animal” is a frame part of ”cow”.
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4 Structural semantics
We will now desribe our position with respect to the contents of Chapter 8 of Lyons’ book,
where socalled semantic fields are discussed.
4.1 Structuralism
We start with the following quotation: ”Linguistic units are but points in a system, or
network, of relations; they are the terminals of these relations, and they have no prior
and independent existence.”. This is completely in line with the paradigm of knowledge
graph theory. We recall in particular that in that theory the meaning of a linguistic unit
is defined as the knowledge graph to which it belongs, implying that there may be many
senses of the unit.
Lyons mentions de Saussure as founder of modern structrural linguistics, whose main
work appeared in 1916. Here we should mention the position of Peirce, who introduced
existential graphs, in 1885, for representing logic. If p and q are propositions, then writing
p and q on paper, the sheet of assertion, and drawing a frame around them can be seen
as representing p ∧ q, the proposition ”p AND q”” in logic. In knowledge graph theory,
developed from 1982 on, the same choice was made for representing the word ”and” by a
word graph. This happened independently. In fact, two other theories can be mentioned
that evolved independently of each other. In 1984 Sowa [22] introduced the theory of
conceptual graphs, taking the work of Peirce as a starting point. However, the formalism
essentially differs from that of knowledge graphs. More importantly, the ways of dealing
with semantics differ completely. Conceptual graph theory tries to get in line with model-
theoretic semantics, whereas in knowledge graph theory the idea of structure as meaning,
like for the AND-frame, is put central. A very simple example should make this important
difference clear. The sentence ”dog bites man” is represented in conceptual graph theory
as
dog        AGENT         bite         OBJECT          man
.
In knowledge graph theory the sentence graph is given as
ALI CAU CAU ALI
ALI
dog man
bite .
This is the semantic knowledge graph. The syntactic knowledge graph is given as
ALI SKO SKO ALI
ALI
noun
verb
noun
.
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Let us now compare these representations. In the conceptual graph we must read:
”bite” has AGENT ”dog” and has OBJECT ”man”. Here we have to know what AGENT
and OBJECT are. The meanings of these two words are presupposed and not described. In
the semantic knowledge graph these words are not mentioned. ”Dog” acts like an AGENT,
because of the CAU-link to the verb ”bite”. Likewise ”man” acts like a PATIENT, because
of the CAU-link from the verb ”bite”. The word graphs of these two words are present as
substructures. In the syntactic knowledge graph the corresponding substructures are word
graphs too, but now for the words SUBJECT and OBJECT, which are syntactical terms!
”Agent”, ”patient”, ”subject” and ”object” are words, with word graphs that determine
their meaning. The ontology of knowledge graph theory simply lies on a deeper level than
that of conceptual graph theory. More comparable with it is the structuralistic theory of
Ebeling [7], of 1974. The author only recently became aware of that theory and made a
comparison [10]. The two theories show remarkable parallels.
4.2 The Saussurean dichotomies
We have postponed the discussion of translation to Section 5. Some remarks are due on
the terminology of de Saussure.
”Langue” and ”parole” have been discussed by many. In line with our focus on mind
processes we distinguish on one hand the set of words and sentences of a language (langue),
i.e., as observed objectively, from the outside so to say. Here we consider purely the
grammatical structure. On the other hand we have the understanding, by construction
of a mind graph, of what is heard and the bringing under words of what a person has in
mind, i.e., the uttering process. That is our position with respect to the term ”parole”,
which is interpreted as language as it is subjectively functioning on the inside.
”Substance” and ”structure” (form) is another distinction. Clearly we will equate
structure with a knowledge graph, in which substructures are word graphs of words in
terms of which the structure can be brought under words. For substance we would suggest
the word graph lexicon at the disposal of the users of a certain language.
The third dichotomy of de Saussure is that of paradigmatic versus syntagmatic rela-
tionships between units in a language-system. The description, given by Lyons, is starting
from the term ”syntagm”, or construction. Meant by ”syntagmatic” is that units can be
combined in an, also semantically, allowed way. But this we met before, when considering
the sentence ”green ideas sleep violently”. The construction is not allowed semantically.
”Green” and ”sleep” are not syntagmatically related, in this sentence. However, in ”green
frogs sleep too” the two units are syntagmatically related. The relationship clearly depends
on the syntagm considered.
Paradigmatic relationships occur for pairs that may be substituted for each other in a syn-
tagm. Here we have a problem when comparing ”big elephants fly” with ”big eagles fly”.
”Elephants” cannot be said to be paradigmatically related to ”eagles” as the first syntagm
is not an allowed one. We would like to demand that the comparison will be based on
allowed structures.
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Like Lyons, we will not say much on the synchronic/diachronic dichotomy. The terms
apply to investigation of languages, at some moment in time respectively in the course of
time. For knowledge graph theory only the latter seems interesting. The meaning of words
changes in the course of time and therewith the word graphs.
4.3 Semantic fields
We can be short on relativism and functionalism. The first term refers to the hypothesis
that ”the actualization of particular distinctions in different language-systems is completely
arbitrary”. We would say that the choice of word graphs is completely arbitrary and agree
with this hypothesis, due to Whorf [26]. At the same time universalism is accepted too,
due to our thesis that the knowledge graph ontology is universal.
Functionalism, as described by Lyons, ”is the view that the structure of every language-
system is determined by the particular functions that it has to perform”. We will not go
into this.
We have to take position to what Lyons says about semantic fields. This subject was
studied a.o. by Trier [23] (1934), in a time where in physics various ”fields” were studied
intensively. Possibly the term was introduced in analogy. Like a charged particle derives
its behaviour from the electromagnetic field of other charges, linguistic units are consid-
ered to be subject to the influence of the whole vocabulary of a language. Lyons mentions
the following passage from Trier’s work: ”Fields are living realities intermediate between
individual words and the totality of the vocabulary; as parts of a whole they share with
words the property of being integrated in a larger structure (sich ergliederen) and with the
vocabulary the property of being structured in terms of smaller units (sich ausgliedern).”.
The resemblance with knowledge graph theory is striking. The total mind graph of a mind
contains all the word graphs at its disposal. The meaning of a word can be any substruc-
ture of the mind graph that contains the word graph. The field concept corresponds with
such a substructure. Like the word graphs it is part of the whole mind graph and like them
it can be expressed in the knowledge graph ontology.
This concludes our remarks on Chapter 8 of Lyons’ book.
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5 The essential problems of translation
In this section we will discuss translation, a subject dealt with here and there in the book
of Lyons.
In knowledge graph theory translation takes place according to:
(2)   Sentence graph in L1                                                 Sentence graph in L2
(1)   Sentence in L1                                                           Sentence graph in L1
(3)   Sentence graph in L2                                                 Sentence in L2
STRUCTURAL PARSING
TRANSFORMATION
UTTERING
.
A sentence in L1 is mapped on a knowledge graph called sentence graph. This process
is called structural parsing (1), see Zhang [28]. A sentence graph in L2 can be uttered
(3) in L2, usually in more than one way, see Zhang [28]. The main problem is (2), the
transformation of the sentence graph in L1 into a sentence graph in L2. Liu [15] has
investigated the translation of a Chinese sentence into an English sentence as performed
by the system of Yao, a Chinese linguist, and compared this with translation according to
the knowledge graph approach.
Let us assume that a sentence in L1 can be structurally parsed and mapped on a sentence
graph in L1. We have to map this knowledge graph on a knowledge graph in L2 with the
same meaning. This is easy when we can apply word by word substitution maintaining the
structure. We immediately get the required sentence graph and we can utter this graph
by the rules of L2, which is a process we also assume can be carried out. So where do the
real problems come in? We will follow the remarks and examples of Lyons and will also
discuss some points, typical for knowledge graph theory.
The first problem is that a word has many meanings, its senses. We phrased this as
homonymy being abundant. Many word graphs can be associated with a word, each giving
a different meaning to the word. Lyons too speaks of nuclear or central meaning of a
word. By using definitions a single word graph can be expanded into a larger word graph
as the words used in the definition have word graphs of their own. In a sentence graph, by
expansion some tokens may be replaced by the frame contents. In this way a sentence graph
becomes expanded, in fact in many different directions. Not only in the mind different mind
graphs may be generated this way. Also in the case of given descriptions of word graphs
we can have a more or less extensive structure, as everyone knows who has ever compared
different dictionaries. The sentence graph obtained by structural parsing depends on the
quality of the word graph lexicon used. We assume one lexicon that is agreed upon in
language L1 and one in language L2. But then too expansion can yield different sentence
graphs. This opens possibilities for translation as a more explicit sentence graph may allow
more ways to transform the graph.
The second problem is that for a word in L1 no direct counterpart in L2 is present.
For transforming the sentence graph two approaches can be followed. The sentence graph
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is covered by structures for which in L2 words exist, and possibly not in L1. To achieve
this covering it might be necessary to expand the sentence graph in L1. But even then the
covering might on one hand be not complete, whereas on the other hand more structure,
meaning, might be introduced. For following the first approach a word graph lexicon in
L2 is necessary. A dictionary, explaining a word in L1 in terms of words of L2, is necessary
in the second approach. These explanations form then structures, syntagms, in L2 and
substitution in the sentence graph in L1 then gives a sentence graph in L2. Again that
graph may have less meaning than the corresponding sentence graph in L1, as well as more
meaning.
These two problems for an automated translation based on knowledge graph theory
form the bottleneck. They make clear that it may be impossible to translate certain
sentences in principle! We will now consider a few examples.
Lyons gives the example of translating into French the sentence ”The cat sat on the
mat”. He refrains, as we do, from consideration of tense and some other aspect like rhyme.
How to translate ”the cat”? In French we have ”le chat” and ”la chatte”. The first cat
is male, or its sex is left undetermined. The second cat is female. Anyhow, ”cat” and
”chat” are denotationally non-equivalent, their word graphs are essentially different. The
subject of the sentence can occur in the sentence graph as token of type ”cat”, where we do
not indicate the determiner ”the”. The expansion of ”cat” to ”male or female cat” would
make the covering possible by using the word graph for ”chat” for transforming this part.
Likewise information that the cat was female, which might be clear from the context, may
make the use of the word graph for ”chatte” possible. ”Sit” and ”sit down” correspond to
”eˆtre assis” and ”s’asse´oir”, so here the choice is easy. Lyons focuses on the translation of
”the mat”.
”Mat”, ”rug” and ”carpet”, etc. on one hand and ”tapis”, ”paillason”, ”carpette”, etc. on
the other hand show no denotational equivalency, due to subtle differences. Lyons’ choice
to accept this and use the most similar counterpart is the easy way out. It is an example
of the second type of problem we mentioned. The word ”mat” can be analyzed in French
by using a dictionary, replacing that part of the sentence graph by the found structure
and possibly covering the resulting structure by other words from the French word graph
lexicon. Any further information on ”mat”, from context, or from an English dictionary,
i.e., by expanding first, may make the transformation more easy, as most denotationally
equivalent pairs of words will describe less complex concepts, which have a high probability
to have a name in both languages. Webster’s dictionary [25], gives as one of the meanings
of ”mat”: ”a piece of coarse fabric made of rushes, straw or wool”. This expansion gives
the sentence ”The cat sat on the piece of coarse fabric, etc.”. The words occurring now
may be more easily translated into French than ”mat” is.
Our second example is the Chinese sentence ”Men kou yu ren”, literally this reads
”Door mouth have man”. The English translation given by a translater will be something
like ”There is a man standing in the opening of the door”. We assume that ”ren” can be
simply replaced by ”man”. The first problem is one of structural parsing. ”Men kou” is
a fixed combination in Chinese, but we will consider the combination door+mouth. Only
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by expansion can the two words be combined. Both ”door” and ”mouth” have an opening
which is a part of space, at a certain location. The combined uttering here focuses on the
common element. The knowledge graph is:
ALI                                                ALI
FPAR            FPAR
ALI                   PAR                      ALI
PAR
(location)
ALI
door                                                                             mouth
(space)                                                                            (opening)
.
”Opening” is connected to ”door” and ”mouth” by an FPAR-link as we discovered the
link between ”door” and ”mouth” by discovering the common element in the expansions.
”Location” is, like ”time”, attributed to concepts. The parentheses stress that ”location”,
”space” and ”opening”, do not occur in the (Chinese) sentence.
The second problem too concerns structural parsing. ”Have” is read as ”be with” in knowl-
edge graph theory. ”With” can be represented by any of the three merological relationship
types: PAR-, SUB- or FPAR-link. Now the expansion of ”man” is needed to link this con-
cept to the knowledge graph we gave before. The fact that ”man” occupies space, which
can be a part of the space of ”opening” suggests the SUB-link, so that we get the following
sentence graph.
ALI                                               ALI
FPAR                      FPAR
ALI
ALI                    SUB                      ALI
ALI                                                 ALI
(opening)
[ren]
be
[yu]
FPAR
PAR                        PAR
door                                                                           mouth
(space)                                                                             (space)
man                                                                              (location)
[men]                                                                        [kou]
.
The sentence graph may be read (in Chinese) as ”door mouth be with man”. But
now the transformation of this graph has to take place. Let us assume that all occurring
(Chinese) words have direct counterparts in English, which are given in the graph. Then
the same graph also gives the sentence graph in English. The second step of the translation
therefore seems easy once we have chosen the right expansions. Just bring this graph under
words and then follow the rules for uttering, the third step. However, this will not be what
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a translater would do. First of all, the word ”mouth” would not be used. The opening
of the door is essential. The sentence graph may be reduced, without essentially changing
what is meant to be said, to
ALI
ALI                                                ALI
PAR                                    FPAR
ALI                     SUB                     ALI
ALI
PAR
door
location
be
FPAR
man                                                                             opening
space                                                                            space
.
We have omitted the parentheses as the words occurring might all be used, or words
that can be present as substructures. The substructure:
ALI
PAR
location
ALI                     SUB                        ALI
space                                                                                 space
may be present in the English word graph lexicon as word graph for ”at”. If space is
seen as property of door (by the transitivity of the FPAR-link) the concept ”opening”
might be skipped, like ”mouth”, and the uttering could be ”man at door”, which would
be extended, by uttering rules, to ”(there) is (a) man) at (the) door”, which is a perfectly
English sounding translation.
Another way of restructuring the sentence graph would be to frame the SUB-link, which
is a word graph for ”in”. Framing the FPAR-link between ”opening”-token and ”door”-
token, which contains a word graph for ”of” we may utter the sentence graph as ”be man
in opening of door”, or, extended, ”(there) is (a) man in (the) opening of (the) door”.
Note that both resulting translations do not cover the whole given sentence graph, in
the sense that the sentence graphs of the given translations possibly are not completely
identical with the given one. However, by expanding the sentence graphs of these two
translations, so now structurally parsing these translations, the given sentence graph in
English, or a graph containing it, may be recovered.
These two examples should illustrate the problems automatic translation by means of
knowledge graphs is facing. It should also illustrate that a natural translater interprets a
given sentence and can choose from several possible transformed and restructured sentence
graphs in the target language to achieve an ”economic” translation, i.e., grasping the
essential meaning in such a way that the given translation is understandable in that way.
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